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1993

Executive Research Project
S96

The Paradoxical and Unintended Effects of the War on Drugs

Commander
Lillian E. Fishburne
U.S. Navy

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MAR 09 1994
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Faculty Research Advisor
Colonel Gary Leeling, USA

94-07716



The Industrial College of the Armed Forces
National Defense University
Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319-6000

9 4 3 8 1 3 1

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 5

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY N/A		3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE N/A			
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) NDU-ICAF-93- <i>S 96</i>		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) Same	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Industrial College of the Armed Forces	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable) ICAF-FAP	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION National Defense University	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, D.C. 20319-6000		7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, D.C. 20319-6000	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.
		TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.

11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)

The Paradoxical and Unintended Effects of the War on Drugs

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)

Lillian E. Fishburne

13a. TYPE OF REPORT Research	13b. TIME COVERED FROM Aug 92 TO Apr 93	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) April 1993	15. PAGE COUNT 33
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16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

SEE ATTACHED

20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS	21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Judy Clark	22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (202) 475-1889
22c. OFFICE SYMBOL ICAF-FAP	

ABSTRACT

THE PARADOXICAL AND UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON DRUGS

By CDR Lillian E. Fishburne, U.S. Navy

The paper examines paradoxical and unintended effects of U.S. policies and strategies to stem the flow and domestic use of illicit drugs. These effects tend to complicate resolution of the drug dilemma. The cornerstone of U.S. drug efforts is a short term, supply-side approach to suppress the production and trafficking of illegal drugs. Some unintended consequences of this approach are increased illicit drug production, generated peasant support for insurgents in producing countries, increased official corruption, overburdened judicial and penal systems, increased drug hardening, and the rise of more sophisticated drug traffickers. The need for more emphasis on demand-side efforts to decrease U.S. domestic use of illicit drugs is steadily gaining momentum. Demand reduction strategies focus on prevention, treatment and rehabilitation programs, and the need for a cultural change. Recommendations to minimize the unintended effects of U.S. anti-drug policies include funding of long term programs which provide legal, viable economic alternatives for drug producing peasants, more funding for multilateral counternarcotics programs, and more funding for drug treatment and rehabilitation programs.

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THE PARADOXICAL AND UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON DRUGS

"The paradoxical effects often complicate public policy, contrary to expectation or intent."¹

INTRODUCTION

Since the turn of the century, the United States has sought to control illegal drugs. The rampant spread of crack cocaine and the dramatic increase in drug related violence in the 1980s led President Ronald Reagan and then President George Bush to declare "war on drugs." With the ending of the Cold War at the close of the decade, "more Americans identified drugs as the number one threat to the country than any other problem."² Although there has been a decline in drug use since 1985, illicit drug abuse and drug trafficking still remain at epidemic levels in the United States. Trade in illegal drugs is considered by many to be the fastest growing business. Today, an estimated 500,000 Americans are addicted to heroin.³ There are 20 million users of marijuana and 25-30 million users who have experimented with cocaine or regularly use it.⁴ Drug abuse and drug trafficking generate an annual underground retail earning in excess of \$100 billion which is two times what the United States spends on oil and one-third of the defense budget.⁵

In his article, "Paradoxical Effects in Political Systems," John Beahrs postulates that political systems are inundated with effects which run counter to policy intent or expectations.

Furthermore, he contends that when a specific social ill is defined as unacceptable and specific corrective action is taken, then, instead of the intended or expected effects the following occur: 1) the underlying problem worsens; 2) related new problems arise; or 3) the same problem surfaces in a different form or at another level.⁶ Most authorities agree that there is no quick fix nor adequately reliable valid single solution to the drug dilemma. This paper examines the paradoxical or unintended effects of United States policies to control illegal drugs and how they complicate U.S. efforts in reaching a resolution to the drug dilemma and proposes solutions to minimize these effects.

SUPPLY REPRESSION STRATEGY

The illicit drugs consumed in the U.S. are predominantly: 1) cocaine and crack, derivatives of coca leaves; 2) heroin, derived from the opium poppy; and, 3) marijuana and hashish from the cannabis plant. Cocaine and crack come into the U.S. from the South American Andean region. Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia supply almost all the world's coca leaves. However, heroin entering the U.S. market is produced in two regions of the world--The Golden Triangle (Thailand, Burma, and Laos) and The Golden Crescent (Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan). Although plenty of the marijuana consumed in the U.S. is grown here, other source countries include Mexico (world's largest producer), Colombia, Jamaica, and Belize. Hashish is principally produced in Lebanon, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Morocco.⁷

Demand-Supply

A basic economic principal is that demand generates supply. Historically, the cornerstone of United States policy is the suppression of illicit drugs at the drug trails' origin. Ironically as the policy is pursued, the demand for illicit drugs from the international community and the United States has contributed to a rise in the number of suppliers from a variety of producing countries. For example, Mario De Franco and Ricardo Godoy state that coca leaf cultivation has spread to Panama, Ecuador, Venezuela, Guatemala, Brazil and Argentina.⁸ Bolivia and Peru have increased production to meet cocaine demand.⁹ "The explosive world demand for cocaine has turned coca into a lucrative export commodity that is now the most important component of the regional (Andean) economy," according to Peter Andreas and Kenneth Sharpe.¹⁰

Increased demand for illicit drugs over the past two decades has provided a substantial incentive for organized crime to take over the drug supply business. Small scale smuggling of the drugs into the consumer countries could not meet demand. Therefore, price rises due to insufficient quantity to meet demand attracted the attention of existing crime organizations and motivated others to devise ways to enter the trade.¹¹ The Colombian black marketers, for instance, were into illicit emerald smuggling and marijuana trafficking in the early 1970s. During this period, the FBI raided U.S. amphetamine laboratories, prices rose, availability decreased and use became more risky, and cocaine was rapidly

becoming the recreational drug. The Colombians entered the cocaine business because the profit margins were greater than marijuana and the international market was unlimited.¹²

Many new criminal organizations have entered into the illicit drug business to supply international demand: the Chinese Triads, which are beginning to replace traditional organized crime networks in the Asian heroin market; the Mexican mafia, which specializes in cocaine, marijuana, and Mexican heroin; the Colombian cocaine cartels; the Japanese Yakuza, which are pushing narcotics, primarily heroin, with networks in Hawaii and the western United States; and the Jamaican Posse, who traffic in large volumes of drugs and firearms throughout the United States.¹³

Suppression at the Source

The basic United States philosophy to suppress illicit drugs at the source has been to use the "carrot and stick" approach, essentially, to get producer countries governments to convince hundreds of thousands of people to stop growing, processing, and shipping illicit drugs. Current U. S. strategies used to suppress drugs in the producing country are: (1) eradication programs; (2) development of substitute cash crops; (3) military assistance; (4) decertification --the stick.

Eradication of illicit drug crops involves physically uprooting the poppy, coca, and marijuana plants or spraying them with an herbicide. The United States supports eradication by supplying the chemicals and aircraft for spraying, technical

assistance, specialized equipment, and monetary incentives to growers. Although the U.S. supported eradication programs in fourteen countries in 1988, the State Department acknowledged that the programs were "insufficient to reduce the worldwide supply of narcotics."¹⁴ Much of the literature on crop eradication programs confirms that the programs have not been successful in reducing drug production. In fact a Newsweek article reports that the Bolivian forced eradication program in which peasants were offered \$2,000 per hectare to eradicate their coca crops resulted in an expansion of the drug trade.¹⁵ "Many growers just destroyed their worst plants, collected the money and replanted further in the jungle."¹⁶ In the Andean region these programs had the unintended effect of destabilizing governments by galvanizing peasant coca workers resistance and alignment with insurgency groups, such as the Shining Path in Peru; to engage in strikes and blockades organized by powerful regional coca growers' federations; and, to sometimes engage in armed resistance. As De Franco and Godoy state, "the policies to eradicate coca cultivation have contributed to the growing militarism of the country (Bolivia), which poisons the political and investment climate of the nation."¹⁷

Another failing program is the crop substitution program which seeks to motivate farmers away from growing coca, opium poppy, and marijuana plants to cultivating domestic food crops for commercial market. There are several reasons for the failure: (1) economic incentives favor coca and opium poppy cultivation over food crops

by a margin as much as fifty to one; (2) lack of an infrastructure (roads, transportation, etc) to get the produce to market; and (3) bureaucratic red tape.¹⁸ For example, in the case of Peru, the interest rate is so high that the growers, in addition to the substitute crop, cultivate coca plants in order to pay the interest on their domestic food crop loans.¹⁹

In its military assistance program, the U.S. provides monetary aid, U.S. advisors, training, and equipment to support counternarcotics programs in producer countries. Currently, the Andean region (Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia) is the leading recipient of U.S. military aid. In 1990 drug related military aid jumped to more than \$140 million from \$5 million in 1988.²⁰ According to the 1990 report of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the increased aid was to "strengthen a country's national will to initiate and sustain counternarcotics programs."²¹ However, paradoxically, the effect can be to make corruption more profitable and institutional will to fight drugs more elusive.²² For example, pervasive drug related corruption, including the use of military controlled airfields by drug traffickers, has undermined Peru's military will to support the drug war.²³ In the spring of 1990, high ranking Colombian military officials told U.S. congressional investigators that \$38.5 million of \$40.2 million in counternarcotics military aid had been used to fight insurgents in a region not known for drug trafficking.²⁴

In the Andean region, there is a conflict between the narcotics objectives of the United States to curtail the flow of

illicit drugs northward across its borders and the objectives of the Andean countries. Colombia's objective is to contain the widespread violence by the drug cartels against the government, particularly, the judiciary system and the people. Peru and Bolivia are attempting to find economically viable alternatives for its coca growing peasants and to contain their insurgency movements.²⁵

The stick, decertification, is contained in the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act. Under this law, producing countries that do not engage in counternarcotics efforts to suppress production of illicit drugs will be deprived of U.S. foreign aid and benefits. Although a known source for marijuana and a transiting country for the flow of cocaine into the U.S., Mexico has not been decertified. Nor has the Bahamas been decertified even though it provides a sanctuary for drug smugglers and money laundering financial facilities for drug dealers.²⁶ Although decertification is used as a tool to pressure countries to suppress production, on the flip side for those countries which are in fact decertified, the U.S. undermines its drug enforcement cooperation and minimizes the growth of legal business alternatives to drug production and trafficking.

ENFORCEMENT

International Trafficking

International traffickers of illicit drugs use every conceivable organizational, strategic, and tactical means to move their products to market and to conceal illicit sales proceeds.

The United States employs two strategies to combat international illegal drug trafficking--interdiction and law enforcement.

Interdiction, supposedly, reduces street sales by increasing production and smuggling costs through disruption of the trafficking network and interception of the drugs before crossing the borders of the United States. However, as the U.S. expands its interdiction efforts through increased surveillance of land, sea, and air approaches to its frontier, the drug traffickers resort to more sophisticated technology and equipment and other tactics that are more difficult to detect. In turn, only the stronger more efficient traffickers survive, resulting in higher supplies and lower costs. As this occurs, traffickers seek wider markets and alternate routes.

Although interdiction is supposed to reduce street sales by increasing production and smuggling costs, interdiction, in fact, raises the street price. This assumes that production and smuggling costs are a significant percentage of street price, but that is not true. For example, it costs about \$1000 to produce and refine one kilo of cocaine that eventually may retail on the street for \$250,000 per quarter or eighth gram.²⁷ Smuggling costs may amount to an additional small percentage of the retail cost. Most of that price is divided among the distributors on the U.S. side of the border. As Peter Reuter, a Rand economist, explains, "almost 99% of the price of the drug when sold on the streets in the United States is accounted for by payments to people who distribute it."²⁸ Therefore, doubling or tripling smuggling costs

will have little impact. Street prices of cocaine have dropped dramatically, by 60 to 75 per cent, since the Reagan Administration introduced its "war on drugs" in 1982, headed by then Vice President Bush.²⁹

The borders of the United States can not be sealed, according to Peter Reuter, who studied the question for the Department of Defense.³⁰ The Mexican border is especially permeable because there are few barriers from the south to transporting drugs into the country; and, they can be brought across by small plane, private vehicle, or even by boat. There are not enough human resources to physically seal the over thousands of miles of borders. A Mexican American California narcotics agent made a similar observation in an interview in 1989: "Four hundred thousand of my people cross the border every year. How can you stop a much smaller number who are carrying a kilo or two of cocaine on their back?"³¹

Drug Hardening

When the Nixon Administration succeeded in reducing the supply of low potency Mexican marijuana to California in the early 1970s, agriculturally skilled drug entrepreneurs developed a high potency marijuana, sensimilla, industry in northern California, generating a market for a drug five or more times as potent.³² As the Nixon Administration increased surveillance of the Mexican border and sprayed the Mexican marijuana fields with a herbicide, the small smugglers were driven out of business. On the other hand, the

larger smuggling organizations switched to a more potent, compact, transportable product--cocaine. The paradox is the more successful law enforcement is at cutting off supply, the more incentive drug dealers have for hardening drugs, for developing varieties that are more potent, portable, and dangerous.

Imagine if the United States actually could destroy the Peruvian, Bolivian, and Colombian cocaine fields. It is likely that underground chemists could design and manufacture what addicts would consider the ideal drug one with the kick of crack and the longevity of crank (methamphetamine). Indeed, a powerful new drug, a colorless and odorless form of crystal methamphetamine, called ice, is said to be sweeping Hawaii and is threatening to invade the West coast ports of San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Portland.³³ It would be just a matter of time before ice found its way across the country to replace crack as the drug of choice in the 1990s.

Official Corruption

There is no doubt that illicit drug manufacturers, smugglers and distributors operate more effectively by corrupting public officials. The bribe is a familiar part of law enforcement in many of the illicit drug producing countries such as Bolivia, Burma, Peru, and Columbia. According to the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Jorge Luis Ochoa, a major Colombian drug trafficker, "was able to buy his freedom through the intimidated and vulnerable Colombian judicial system."³⁴ Investigative reporter Francisco Reyes reports that Vladimiro

Montesinos, a long time lawyer for drug traffickers, is the head of Peru's National Intelligence Service which runs Peru's counternarcotics strategy. He also reports the Peruvian security forces have not captured a single important drug trafficker in the past year.³⁵ In another example of corruption, he cites an incident in which during daylight hours the National police protected an airstrip while Colombian planes landed and loaded thousands of kilos of coca paste.

What of our own law enforcement officials? We are all too familiar with the narcotics scandals involving not only law enforcement officials but also elected public officials and members of the judicial system in various cities, especially New York and Miami. Such corruption is not confined to the East Coast. Deputies in the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department were involved in what the Los Angeles Times called "one of the worst corruption cases" in the department's history.³⁶ Although the possibilities of official misconduct exist in any form of vice investigation, it is only in drug enforcement where large sums of cash and drugs are held by offenders who are in no position to complain about being ripped off by law enforcement agents. Of course, not all narcotics police are corrupt; as a matter of fact it is a small minority who are corrupt. However, it is difficult to uncover narcotics corruption, particularly when a small number of individuals are involved. Probably, whatever amount of corruption discovered is just the tip of the iceberg. Such misconduct must be counted as one of anticipated costs of expanding

drug law enforcement.

Prison Networking

Even if the United States could build new facilities, imprisonment is not necessarily stigmatic or entirely punitive for those who sell drugs. A study of jailed California drug dealers, by Jerome Skolnick, indicated that imprisonment may offer a kind of homeboy status, especially for gang youth, for whom the institution can become an alternative neighborhood. Moreover, imprisonment often motivates prisoners in their illegal ways. In jail they join gangs, use drugs, and make useful connections for buying and selling illegal drugs. In the factual book, Kings of Cocaine, authors Gugliotta and Leen describe how Carlos Lehder devised a cocaine smuggling operation while incarcerated at the Danbury State prison in Connecticut during the mid 1970s. With the expertise provided by fellow prisoners, Lehder developed a plan to smuggle cocaine into the U.S. using marijuana smuggling American pilots; to create a sanctuary in Belize for drug smugglers; and to launder drug money through offshore banks. Prior to Lehder's efforts, the Colombians were smuggling small amounts of cocaine in suitcases to the U.S. Once Lehder set his plan into action, the Colombians were able to smuggle huge amounts of cocaine into the U.S., amass large fortunes, and eventually organize into a cocaine cartel. Carlos Lehder became a family head in the notorious Colombian Medellin drug cartel.³⁷

DEMAND

There is no doubt that illicit drug demand drives the illicit drug market. Although law enforcement efforts designed to increase user risks have been expanded, illicit drug use remains high in the United States. According to the Carnegie Endowment National Commission, twenty-six million Americans reported using illicit drugs in 1991 and almost half acknowledged using drugs at least once a month.³⁸ For years the illicit drug producing countries have told drug consuming nations that drug trafficking would not exist if there was no demand and that these countries needed to look at efforts to decrease their consumption. In 1971 when President Nixon initially implemented the war on drugs, emphasis on reducing illicit drug demand was included in the anti-drug policy. President Bush renewed the emphasis on reduction of consumption at the 1990 drug summit in Colombia. Emphasis on reduction of demand has been nothing but rhetoric. During the twenty years of war on drugs, seventy per cent of the annual counternarcotics budgets have been dedicated to reducing the supply of illicit drugs while only thirty per cent has been allocated towards reducing demand.³⁹ According to Peter Reuter, "the federal budget for drug control increased from \$1.5 billion in 1980 to almost \$13 billion in 1992, two-thirds of which went to enforcement programs. State and local governments, which together spent another \$18 billion or so on drug control in 1990, were even more enforcement-oriented, with 80

percent of their money going for enforcement."⁴⁰ The majority of literature on the war on drugs in the United States emphasizes that the U.S. needs to fight the war at home--reduce its demand.

Currently, the U.S. pursues basically three strategies in its war at home: first, law enforcement for deterrent and punitive measures; second, intervention through treatment and rehabilitation programs; and, third, prevention through education, media, civic organizations, etc.

Law Enforcement

State and federal prison populations nearly doubled in the 1980s and have tripled since the 1960s. For example, the number of persons sent to federal prison on drug charges increased from 2,300 in 1980 to 13,000 in 1990. Not only has the number of persons imprisoned increased but also the time incarcerated rose. During this period the expected time served rose from 20 months to 60 months. On the state level during 1981 to 1989, the number sentenced to more than 12 months went from 11,500 to 90,000. Also, several hundred thousands of persons have spent weeks or months in local jails on drug charges.⁴¹

Penal institutions overcrowded to 150 percent capacity are deluged with newly convicted criminals, as well as those whose probation or parole were revoked, mainly because they failed their drug tests after being released to the community. For example, California had a 3200% increase in parole violators who returned to prison between 1978 and 1988. ⁴²

As law enforcement and drug testing technology advanced, more parolees and probationers returned to prison creating the overcrowded conditions. However, the U.S. cannot continue to convict them and impose longer sentences without building new penal institutions. Although President Bush acknowledged the problem that most state prisons are operating far above their designed capacity and that many states have been forced under court order to release prisoners before their terms have been served whenever a court established prison population has been exceeded, he did not recommend giving additional federal funds to states to build new facilities. President Bush's National Drug Strategy says nothing about how to finance, staff, and pay for the continuous and increasing expense of states maintaining prisons. The only solution for state governments is to persuade their citizens, who feel they are overburdened with taxes, to provide financial support. Not only are the citizens reluctant to pay for prisons but they also are even more reluctant to live next to them.

Compounding the problem in reducing use through penal institutions is the fact that very few facilities provide drug treatment programs for users and that prisoners are able to obtain illicit drugs while confined.⁴³

Treatment

Prior to 1975, the funds for public treatment programs came primarily from federal funds. Now two-thirds are from state, local, and private sources due to federal resource attrition during

1975 through 1986.⁴⁴ Public treatment programs have suffered from state and local fiscal constraints of the 1990s. For instance, in the District of Columbia, the budget for drug treatment programs was decreased by one-third in 1991 even though the District has the highest rate of hard core cocaine addicts in the nation.⁴⁵

Due to the high cost of inpatient care in private drug treatment facilities, as much as \$35,000, middle class income people are forced to use the already overcrowded public treatment centers because of insurance limits.⁴⁶

Experts working in the treatment programs complain of lack of enough treatment centers and the underfunding of the programs. According to the Institute of Medicine, the funds needed to upgrade and expand public drug treatment programs, residential and outpatient, would cost \$2.2 billion in annual operating costs and an additional \$1.1 billion in one-time costs. However, President Bush only earmarked \$100 million for drug treatment programs which is just a mere scratch on the surface.⁴⁷

RECOMMENDATIONS

In general, Americans acknowledge that the illicit drug problem, next to the economy, is the gravest domestic threat facing the country.⁴⁸ Whereas a general consensus exists as to identification of the threat, there is no consensus as to root cause or resolution. There are those who believe social conditions, such as poverty and disintegration of the inner cities, is the root cause; others blame the 1960s counterculture and

permissiveness. Proposed solutions for resolving the problem range from legalization of illicit drugs to treatment and rehabilitation programs for drug abusers to repressive tougher law enforcement for drug abusers and traffickers.

Before revising its strategy for the war on drugs, the U.S. must reorient its thinking. With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. must evaluate its options with consideration given to:

- o Global context. Illicit drug trafficking and drug use are a serious problem for most nations, as well as the United States. In its efforts to reduce supply, the U.S. has relied traditionally upon bilateral agreements with producing and transiting countries to stem the flow of illicit drugs across its borders. Given the current domestic economic constraints and reduction of federal government budget and personnel, especially the Department of Defense, it is imperative that the U.S. reorient its efforts to reduce the supply of illicit drugs towards more multilateral and coalitional efforts. The U.S. can no longer play the role of the "world's cop." The environment in which we live in the 1990s is global and without economic and social boundaries. For instance, if the U.S. was able to stop the flow of illicit drugs into the U.S., the drug traffickers would just find markets in other nations.

- o Domestic Environment. Faced with a widely acknowledged \$4 trillion federal budget deficit, a reduction in military forces, increasing international economic competition, and growing social ills, the U.S. no longer has resources to waste. Many of the

social ills, such as the spread of AIDS, soaring transfer payments, increasing crime rates, an overburdened judicial system, and overcrowded penal institutions are exacerbated by illicit drug trafficking and drug use. With the American public's cry for reduced federal government spending, the U.S. must reorient its thinking with regards to expenditure of funds for the war on drugs. It must gear its thinking towards more investment spending on the war vice "stop gap" short term spending programs, such as \$350 million over a two year period for a Bolivian drug interdiction program.⁴⁹ Yet, the U.S. only provides \$5 million annually to the United Nations' counternarcotics efforts.⁵⁰

o Producer Countries' Perspectives. Current U.S. strategies do not appear to take into account the cultural, economic, or political conditions of the illicit drug producing countries. Typically, these countries are Third World countries with unstable economies and unstable governments. The illicit drugs are usually cultivated in virtually inaccessible, remote areas where few, if any, other cash crops will grow. In many of the illicit drug producing countries, the consumption of illicit drugs is a part of the cultural heritage. For example, the Peruvian and Bolivian peasant coca leaf growers consider chewing coca leaves a cultural tradition dating back 2000 years. Therefore, they attach no stigma or evil to the consumption of illicit coca products.

For many countries, the production of illicit drugs has become an integral part of the economy that cannot be replaced. Accounting not only as a significant portion of a country's total

exports, sometimes the drug business surpasses in value the country's legal exports.⁵¹ Columbia's drug business, for example, is 28 to 43 per cent of its total exports, and generates more money than its major export, coffee.⁵² Moreover, the drug business is a major source of employment in many countries. For instance, it requires 304,000 coca farmers, paste processors and transporters, and refiners to meet the requirements of 300 cocaine exporters.⁵³

With regard to political conditions, the U.S. must recognize that many of the producing countries' governments are engaged in civil wars against insurgencies. Current strategies, such as eradication and substitution programs, as well as U.S. counternarcotics training to their military forces, increases not only the resistance of the insurgent groups but also generates growers' support for these groups. The use of U.S. agents for in country counternarcotics training programs and exercises gives rise to anti-American sentiment in the Andean countries. Therefore, fighting the U.S. war on drugs is not their first priority.

o **Government Denial.** Traditionally, the U.S. has spent 70 per cent of its counternarcotics budget on supply side efforts--interdiction and law enforcement. The remaining 30 per cent has been dedicated towards efforts to reduce domestic consumption. Although each administration since President Nixon has acknowledged and has included in its counternarcotics policy statements that the U.S. must reduce its demand, the U.S. continually increases its efforts to reduce the supply of illicit drugs while inadequately providing funding and developing strategies to reduce domestic

demand. Although it is generally acknowledged that interdiction has proved to be the most expensive and least effective means of controlling drugs, the U.S. continues to escalate its interdiction efforts. Theoretically, the U.S. recognizes that domestic demand must be reduced in order to significantly progress in the war on drugs. However, in reality, it is in a state of denial as evidenced by its unwillingness to fully commit to domestic demand reduction.

Specific recommendations to minimize the unintended effects of U.S. strategies to combat illicit drugs are:

- U.S. couple its crop eradication and substitution programs with long-term integrated rural development programs to provide legal, viable economic alternatives to illicit drug production.
- U.S. provide more funding for multilateral, coalition, and United Nations counternarcotics and less for bilateral anti-drug efforts.
- U.S. reallocate drug interdiction funding to provide more domestic drug treatment and rehabilitation programs so that recipients may become viable members of society. These programs are desperately needed both by the poor and by penal institutions, for which an inadequate number of programs exist.
- U.S. provide more funding for research and development of treatment and rehabilitation programs.
- U.S. focus more on treatment programs for first offenders to reintegrate them into the mainstream of society instead of punitive measures such as sentencing them to already overcrowded

prisons.

- o U.S. provide more funds for developing long-term programs to change the American values to refute the use of drugs. This involves getting federal, state, and local government, as well as local community, media, education, and etc. participation and cooperation. The same effort that was mounted against smoking and drinking and driving is required.

CONCLUSIONS

In regard to the U.S. place in the international economy, President Clinton has reiterated that "we must invest in our future." In other words, the U.S. must start thinking long term instead of short term. This is what the U.S. must do if it is to make any significant strides against illicit drugs and to minimize the harmful, unintended effects of current anti-drug policies and strategies. The U.S. must invest in long-term programs to reduce domestic demand, such as prevention, treatment and reintegration programs. The U.S. must invest in a cultural change of values. It must invest in long-term programs to reduce supply. These supply reduction programs must enable illicit drug production workers to earn legal and viable alternative incomes.

ENDNOTES

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